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Indiana's Guilty But Mentally Ill Statute:
Blueprint to Beguile the Jury
In recent years the Indiana legislature has drastically revised the in-
sanity defense to restrict the circumstances in which it can be pleaded
successfully by defendants in criminal trials. In 1978, the legislature shifted
the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence to
the defendant,' largely in response to the much-publicized case of State
v. Kiritsis.2 In 1981, Indiana became the second state to pass a controver-
sial "guilty but mentally ill" statute,' primarily due to public reaction sur-
rounding the case of State v. Judy.4
' IND. CODE § 35-41-4-1 (1982). The constitutionality of this type of law was seemingly
approved by the Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), in which the
Court upheld an Oregon statute requiring a criminal defendant to prove his insanity beyond
a reasonable doubt. In that case, the defendant argued that the statute required him to
establish his innocence by disproving beyond a reasonable doubt elements of the crime
necessary to a guilty verdict, in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Constitution. Id. at 793. The Court disagreed, stating that the prosecution
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged,
including deliberation, malice, and intent. Id. at 794-95. It held that the insanity defense
is a broader concept than any specific element of the criminal offense, see text accompany-
ing note 15 infra, and that the state is thereby permitted to require the defendant to affirm-
atively demonstrate his insanity, a separate legal issue from whether he committed the
crime, to avoid criminal liability. 343 U.S. at 795-96. See also Rivera v. Delaware, 351 A.2d
561, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 (1976) (Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., dissenting); Basham
v. State, - Ind. -, - 422 N.E.2d 1206, 1209 (1981); Norris v. State, Ind. -.
- 419 N.E.2d 129, 134 (1981); Price v. State, - Ind .... 412 N.E.2d 783, 784-85
(1980).
2 269 Ind. 550, 381 N.E.2d 1245 (1978). In that case, the defendant kidnapped an
Indianapolis business executive and held him at gunpoint before the television cameras
of the nation. Press, The Insanity Plea on Trial, NEWSWEEK May 24, 1982, at 56, 59;
Indianapolis Star, Feb. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 5. Indiana law at the time of trial provided that
when a defendant entered a plea of not responsible by reason of insanity, the burden of
proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt was on the state. IND. CODE § 35-41-4-1 (1976)
(repealed 1978); Avery v. State, 269 Ind. 432, 381 N.E.2d 1226 (1978). After Kiritsis, which
resulted in an insanity verdict for the defendant, Indianapolis Star, Oct. 22, 1977, at 1,
col. 1, a proposal to shift the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence
to the defendant, dubbed the "Kiritsis Bill," Indianapolis News, Sept. 11, 1980, at 19, col.
1, passed overwhelmingly in the legislature.
3 IND. CODE § 35-36-2-3 (1982). Michigan was the first state to enact such a statute. MICH.
CoMip. LAws ANN. § 768.36 (1975). After Indiana adopted this law, four other states,
Georgia, Illinois, Delaware, and New Mexico, enacted similar statutes. Leo, Is the System
Guilty?, TIME, July 5, 1982, at 26, 27. Moreover, a large number of other states are con-
sidering adopting such a proposal. Press, supra note 2, at 56.
1- Ind. -, 416 N.E.2d 95 (1981). The case involved the murder of a mother and
her three small children. Concerned citizens, alarmed by the possibility that the defendant
would be found not responsible by reason of insanity and thus not held accountable for
his crimes, formed a group, "Protect the Innocent," which lobbied extensively for the passage
of the guilty but mentally ill provision. Indianapolis News, Sept. 11, 1980, at 19, col. 1.
Ironically, the defendant was convicted by the jury, - Ind. at _ , 416 N.E.2d at 100,
and executed for committing the murders.
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These changes in the criminal law were a response to a public percep-
tion that the insanity defense constitutes a loophole within the criminal
justice system. The public views the insanity defense as a means for the
defendant to avoid criminal responsibility for his misconduct, thereby
undermining the functioning of the legal system.' This belief is reinforced
when the public sees a defendant who has committed a violent crime
released to society a short time after the jury has rendered a verdict
that he was not responsible by reason of insanity.' The belief is further
reinforced when the defendant commits another violent crime after his
release.7 Consequently, the Indiana legislature enacted the guilty but men-
tally ill statute to limit the ability of defendants to successfully plead
insanity as a defense to avoid responsibility for their criminal acts.
This note focuses on the guilty but mentally ill provision, arguing that
it is an objectionable device to confront perceived abuses in the use of
the insanity defense by defendants in criminal trials. The statute is un-
necessary because it neither helps the jury in rendering a decision against
a defendant nor affects the treatment he receives after he has been con-
victed. Moreover, the new law works to deceive juries into rejecting valid
insanity pleas of defendants. It implies to jurors that a guilty but mental-
' See McCall v. States, 77 Ind. 715, 718, 408 N.E.2d 1218, 1221 (1980) (insanity defense
is "uniquely subject to being feigned"); Moore v. State, 260 Ind. 154, 157-58, 293 N.E.2d
28, 30 (1973); H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 6 (1972); A. GOLDSTEIN,
THE INSANITY DEFENSE 3 (1967); R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 144-45
(1967); Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified
Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1, 7-8 & n.34 (1970)
(in study of jurors' attitudes, nearly 81% of jurors believed that "[tihe insanity defense
is a loophole allowing too many guilty men to go free"); N.Y. Times, June 24, 1982, at 15,
col. 1 (in national survey, more than 75% of respondents favored abolition of insanity defense);
Address by Pete Katic, Indiana State Representative (Nov. 21, 1980) (speech by legislator
who presented guilty but mentally ill proposal before Indiana legislature) (tape available
at Indiana Law Journal office). Public response to the acquittal by reason of insanity of
John Hinckley, Jr., for attempting to kill President Reagan exemplifies the outrage that
such verdicts provoke. See, e.g., Leo, supra note 3, at 26; Taylor, The Hinckley Riddle: Outrage
on Acquittal Focuses on Confusion Created by Combining Psychiatry and Law, N.Y. Times,
June 24, 1982, § D, at 21, col. 1; Valente & Kiesnan, Hinckley Verdict Prompts Hill Attack
on Insanity Defense, Wash. Post, June 23, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
For example, in 1979 Leonard Smith shot and killed major league baseball player
Lyman Bostock in Gary, Indiana. Indianapolis Star, Sept. 25, 1978, at 1, col. 1. Smith was
arrested and charged with murder. Id. At the trial, the jury accepted his plea of insanity
and rendered a verdict that he was not responsible for his actions when he committed
the crime. Id., Nov. 17, 1979, at 40, col. 1. A commitment hearing was conducted to deter-
mine his mental state after trial, and the judge committed him to the Indiana Department
of Mental Health for treatment. Id., Dec. 9, 1979, S 3, at 18, col. 2. Less than seven months
after his trial, psychiatrists determined that he was not insane and released him. Id., June
21, 1980, at 21, col. 1.
' In Michigan, for example, two men who had been acquitted from crimes by reason
of insanity were later released from state hospitals after they were found to have recovered
their sanity. Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis,
53 J. URB. L. 471, 482-83 (1976). Soon after their release, one of the men raped two women;
the other murdered his wife. Id. See also Leo, supra note 3; By Reason of Insanity, ABC
News 20/20 Transcript, Show #216, Apr. 29, 1982, at 1-3.
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ly ill defendant will be held reponsibile for his criminal acts and at the
same time singled out as one who needs treatment. In actuality, however,
such a verdict is simply a guilty decision. All offenders, "guilty" and "guilty
but mentally ill" alike, are treated similarly upon conviction. For these
reasons, the statute should be repealed.
A COMPARISON OF THE "INSANE" AND
"GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL" PROVISIONS
Prior to the enactment of the guilty but mentally ill statute, a jury
had a duty to find a defendant guilty, not guilty, or not responsible by
reason of insanity." Indiana's recognition of insanity as a bar to criminal
responsibility mirrors the overwhelming practice of legal systems in the
English-speaking world: the insanity defense is a time-honored tradition
that is well rooted in the Anglo-American system of criminal law.'
This widespread acceptance of the insanity defense has been justified
on at least two grounds. One theory is that a showing of insanity negates
various elements of a criminal offense."0 For example, criminal law general-
ly requires that the defendant evince some form of intent or mens rea
to commit a crime.1 In order to sustain a criminal conviction, the pro-
secution must prove that the defendant possessed this requisite degree
of culpability. One view of insanity, incorporated in Indiana's test,'2 is
that insanity eliminates the defendant's capacity to formulate the mental
element of the offense. 3 Under this view, if an insanity defense is es-
tablished, the prosecution cannot prove an essential element of the crime.
IND. CODE § 35-5-2-3 (1976) (repealed 1981).
S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 125 (1925); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 850-52 (2d ed. 1969). See
generally J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 79-117 (1955); H. FINGARETTE, supra note 5, at 5; R.
SIMON, supra note 5, at 16-33; Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?,
72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963).
,1 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 36, at 269-70 (1972); see G.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 5 10.4.4, at 836 (1978).
" See generally G. FLETCHER, supra note 10, S 6.5; A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 15-16,
203; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 10, § 27; Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court,
1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107; Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States Constitu-
tion: Substantive Criminal Law Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571 (1978).
" See note 16 & accompanying text infra.
" McCall v. State, - Ind. - - 408 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (1980). To the extent that
a finding of insanity negates a defendant's ability to possess the mens tea necessary for
the crime, whether the Constitution requires the insanity defense depends on the constitu-
tionality of the mens rea requirement itself. If a state can constitutionally abolish the re-
quirement of mens rea, and did abolish it, evidence of the defendant's insanity at the time
of the offense would be irrelevant to criminal conviction because intent would no longer
be an element of the crime. The Supreme Court has thus far failed to articulate a definitive
Tens rea requirement. Packer, supra note 11, at 107 ("Mens rea is an important require-
ment, except sometimes.") Most commentators, however, argue in favor of such a require-
ment, at least in the case of serious crimes. See authorities cited note 11 supra.
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Another way to conceptualize the insanity defense in the American legal
system is to view it as an illness or condition that excuses a person af-
flicted with such a disease from the sanctions of the criminal law. 4 Such
a view acknowledges that an insane person may commit a criminal act;
however, it postulates that he should not be punished for that conduct
because to do so would not properly serve the purposes of the criminal
law, namely deterrence, rehabilitation, restraint, and retribution.15 Such
persons lack moral blameworthiness necessary for punishment in a civil-
ized society.
Indiana's insanity statute states: "A person is not responsible for having
engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result of mental disease or defect,
he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of
the conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." 6 Under
this insanity test, a defendant who suffers from a "mental disease or
defect" may be relieved of criminal responsibility for his a~ts. In order
to prove such a disease or defect, the defendant is not required to prove
that he lacked complete mental capacity, but only that he lacked substan-
tial ability to understand the illegality of his conduct or to control his
actions."
The new "guilty but mentally ill" statute attempts to identify yet
another degree of mental incapacity. "Mental illness" in Indiana is de-
fined as a "psychiatric disorder which substantially disturbs a personis
thinking, feeling, or behavior and impairs the person's ability to function.""
It includes, among other conditions, "any mental retardation, epilepsy,
alcoholism, or addiction to narcotics or dangerous drugs.""
The difference between "insanity" and "mental illness" lies in their
scope. Mental illness, as defined in Indiana, is a much broader concept
than insanity. The definitions overlap one another because all individuals
who are legally insane are also mentally ill; however, not all mentally
ill persons are insane. Under Indiana law, a "guilty but mentally ill" defen-
dant is one who suffers from a degree of mental illness that does not
eliminate his ability at the time of the crime to form the required mens
rea or to conform his actions to the requirements of the law."
Another difference between the two classifications involves the defen-
14 G. FLETCHER, supra note 10, S 10.4.4, at 836.
, W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 10, S 36, at 271-72.
16 IND. CODE. S 35-41-3-6(a) (1982). This definition of insanity is a codification of the
American Law Institute's test for insanity, which was adopted by the federal courts in
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966). The Indiana Supreme Court adopted
this test for insanity in Hill v. State, 252 Ind. 601, 251 N.E.2d 429 (1969).
17 However, "mental disease or defect" does not include abnormalities evidenced only
by "repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct." IND. CODE S 35-41-3-6-(b)(1982).
8 Id. S 35-36-1-1 (1982).
19 Id. S 16-14-9.1-1.
See id. S 35-36-2-5(a) (1982).
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dant's responsibility to society. A verdict that the defendant was not
responsible by reason of insanity in theory does not hold the defendant
accountable for his conduct; he is neither imprisoned nor placed on
probation.2' Instead of imposing a sentence, the court holds a commitment
hearing at the earliest opportunity after the trial to determine whether
the defendant is currently mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others.'
On the basis of this determination, the judge either commits the defen-
dant for treatment of his mental illness or releases him to society.' If
the defendant is committed, he may be discharged from that commitment
only by order of the court.24
When a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill or enters a plea to
that effect, however, he is sentenced by the judge in the same manner
as a defendant found guilty.' If he is imprisoned, he is evaluated further
by the Indiana Department of Correction and treated in a manner
psychiatrically proper for his mental illness." Although a defendant found
guilty but mentally ill is treated for his mental illness, he is incarcerated
or placed on probation for the term of his sentence if he is later found
to be mentally soundY Therefore, unlike the defendant found not respon-
sible by reason of insanity, the guilty but mentally ill defendant is im-
prisoned for his criminal conduct, despite the fact that he suffered from
a degree of mental illness at the time he committed the crime.
THEORETICAL EFFECTS OF THE GUILTY BUT
MENTALLY ILL STATUTE ON THE JURY
The guilty but mentally ill statute, as a matter of theory, does not affect
the jury's determination of whether a defendant is insane. Before this
provision became effective, Indiana law did not recognize all degrees of
mental illness as insanity. Instead, the law recognized that some forms
of mental illness exist which do not eliminate a defendant's ability to form
the necessary criminal mens rea or to control his actions. For example,
heavy use of alcohol over an extended period of time is not a valid basis
for applying the insanity defense unless the jury finds that "a defendant's
extensive abuse of alcohol and consequent mental degeneration has in
fact resulted in insanity."28 Similarly, behavioral and emotional problems
1 See id. 35-36-2-4(b) (1982).
1 See id. 35-36-2-4(a) (1982).
23 Id.
24 Id. § 35-36-2-4(b).
21Id. 35-36-2-5(a) (1982).
26Id. §35-36-2-5(b).
' Id.; id. 5 11-10-4-3(d) (1982).
Anderson v. State, - Ind. App. 380 N.E.2d 606, 608-09 (1978); accord,
Jackson v. State, w Ind. -, ., 402 N.E.2d 947, 949-50 (1980); Feller v. State, 264
Ind. 541, 543, 348 N.E.2d 8, 12 (1976); Fisher v. State, 64 Ind. 435, 441-42 (1878).
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resulting from low intelligence' or personality disorders" have been held
not to constitute insanity and therefore do not relieve defendants from
criminal responsibility. These holdings demonstrate that before the enact-
ment of the guilty but mentally ill provision, a jury could find that a defen-
dant was mentally ill but not insane for purposes of negating criminal
responsibility.
The guilty but mentally ill statute in theory does not alter the tradi-
tional decisionmaking process of the jury regarding insanity. Rather, it
merely creates a subcategory of the general guilty verdict. The jury still
must determine whether the defendant's mental illness constituted in-
sanity. A finding of insanity, despite the new law, is still within the pro-
vince of the jury. Thus, as a matter of theory, this new provision will
not curb abuses in the insanity defense because it does not restrict the
circumstances in which it can be applied by the jury.
EFFECTS ON TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS
In addition to not affecting the power of the jury to determine the issue
of insanity, the guilty but mentally ill statute does nothing after the ver-
dict is rendered against a defendant. This is because Indiana provides
a statutory right of treatment to all offenders, regardless of whether they
were adjudged guilty or guilty but mentally ill at trial."
Indiana statutes provide that if any prisoner is found to be mentally
ill, the Department of Correction must either provide him with necessary
treatment or transfer him to the Indiana Department of Mental Health
or a mental health facility.2 Furthermore, a prisoner who believes himself
to be mentally ill and in need of treatment may be transferred to the
Department of Mental Health or a mental health facility if a Department
of Correction psychiatrist determines that the prisoner is in fact mental-
ly ill and in need of such care.'
The psychiatric treatment of guilty but mentally ill offenders in Indiana
is no different from that afforded to guilty offenders who are later found
to be mentally ill. A guilty but mentally ill verdict is not a finding by
the jury that the defendant is presently mentally ill,3 but is only a ver-
I Wilson v. State, 263 Ind. 469, 484, 333 N.E.2d 755, 763 (1974); Hashfield v. State, 247
Ind. 95, 103, 210 N.E.2d 429, 434 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966); Conway v. State,
118 Ind. 482, 490, 21 N.E. 285, 287 (1889).
1 Crane v. State, 269 Ind. 299, 304, 380 N.E.2d 89, 93 (1978); James v. State, 265 Ind.
384, 392, 354 N.E.2d 236, 242 (1976); Swain v. State, 215 Ind. 259, 268, 18 N.E.2d 921, 924,
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 660 (1939).
3, IND. CODE §5 35-36-2-5, 11-10-4-2 (1982).
Id. S 11-10-4-2. The Department of Correction may also contract with local, state, or
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dict that he was mentally ill when he committed the offense. 5 Such a
verdict therefore does not ensure that the defendant will receive
psychiatric treatment. The current mental state of one judged guilty but
mentally ill must still be determined by Department of Correction
psychiatrists, and treatment is provided only at their discretion." Conse-
quently, the guilty but mentally ill statute adds nothing to the practice
of providing psychiatric treatment to guilty offenders who are incarcerated
for their crimes.
PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE GUILTY
BUT MENTALLY ILL STATUTE
Although the guilty but mentally ill statute theoretically does not affect
the jury's resolution of insanity claims,37 in reality it will alter the jury's
decision of whether to find a defendant not responsible by reason of in-
sanity. It will do so because in practice jurors do not always reach deci-
sions in the manner which criminal theory dictates. Jurors often do not
understand the theoretical distinctions between differing mental states.
Moreover, some verdicts are based on how jurors "feel" about a particular
defendant.' A jury often renders its decision on the basis of intangible
factors that are unrelated to the question of whether the defendant pos-
sessed the necessary mens rea or the ability to control his actions. Thus,
in rendering its verdict, the jury considers such factors as the type of
treatment the defendant will receive,"0 the grievousness of the crime
committed" and the amount of sympathy it holds for the defendant.42 These
kinds of considerations raise competing values among jurors. On the one
hand, they do not wish to find defendants not responsible by reason of
insanity when discretionary release procedures allow violent individuals
S Id.
Id. § 35-36-2-5(b). In Michigan, where a guilty but mentally ill statute has been in effect
since 1975, more than 75% of all guilty but mentally ill offenders have been incarcerated
without any treatment. Press, supra note 2, at 60.
See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 28; H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8
(1971); R. SIMON, supra note 5, at 200.
1 In a comprehensive study of 3,576 jury trials, conducted to determine the extent of
the disagreement between judge and jury as decisionmakers, it was concluded that "when
the jury reaches a different conclusion from the judge on the same- evidence, it does so ...
because it gives recognition to values which fall outside the official rules." H. KALVEN &
H. ZEISEL, supra note 38, at 495. See also A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 5; R. SIMON, supra
note 5, at 170-71; H. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH 44-48 (1956); Sannito & Arnolds, Jury
Study Results: Factors at work, 5 TRIAL DIPLOMACY J. 6 (1982); Address by the Honorable
James Clements, Senior Judge, Lake County Superior Court, Criminal Division, Crown
Point, Indiana (Nov. 21, 1980) (concerning guilty but mentally ill provision) (tape available
at Indiana Law Journal office).
" See note 44 infra.
" A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 24; Sannito & Arnolds, supra note 39, at 9.
42 By Reason of Insanity, supra note 7, at 3.
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to go free.' Many jurors believe that the insanity defense runs counter
to a social policy which demands that persons be held accountable for
their criminal misconduct. On the other hand, a jury is also hesitant to
find a defendant guilty when he is obviously mentally ill, even though
the degree of his mental illness may not be sufficient to constitute insanity.
The guilty but mentally ill statute is precisely the type of compromise
verdict the jury is looking for, one which seemingly allows it to condemn
a defendant's behavior while singling him out as a person who needs
treatment." In reality, however, it will dupe the jury into rejecting valid
insanity claims raised by defendants, thereby depriving truly insane defen-
dants of their rights to plead insanity successfully.
CONCLUSION
Indiana's guilty but mentally ill statute is an anomaly in the law.
Enacted to curb abuses in the use of the insanity defense by defendants
in criminal trials, or the perception of abuses, it does nothing to assist
the jury in rendering a verdict against a defendant or to affect the treat-
ment he receives upon conviction. Instead, this legislation leads jurors
to reject valid insanity claims of defendants. It implies a false promise
to the jury that a guilty but mentally ill defendant will be punished for
his crime and at the same time compassionately treated for his mental
illness, thereby satisfying competing social policies of the criminal law-
responsibility and treatment. However, such a ruling in actuality
guarantees no such treatment for defendants convicted under it. A "guil-
ty but mentally ill" offender is simply a "guilty" offender for purposes
of disposition upon conviction. For these reasons, this statute should be
repealed.
SCOTT A. KINSEY
"s See notes 5-7 & accompanying text supra.
" An extensive examination of the factors that influence the opinions and decisions of
individual jurors and juries as collective bodies suggested that they are genuinely con-
cerned about the defendant's fate. See R. SIMON, supra note 5. The study noted that many
jurors felt constrained by the verdict limitations that were placed upon them by the court,
and would have preferred to return a verdict representing a compromise between acquit-
ting a defendant on the grounds of insanity and finding him guilty. Id. at 178. The study
stated: "In many instances the jury would have liked to declare the defendant guilty, but
insane. That kind of verdict would permit the jurors to condemn the defendant's behavior
and at the same time grant him a special dispensation." Id. The guilty but mentally ill
statute on its face seems to provide such a compromise verdict for the jury; however,
a finding of guilty but mentally ill guarantees no special treatment for the defendant con-
victed under it, see notes 31-36 & accompanying text supra.
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